Principle —A general truth; a law comprehending many subordinate truths; as the principles of morality, of law, of government, etc. Doctrine —The truths of the gospel in general. Instruction and confirmation in the truths of the gospel. Law of the gospel —The word of God; the doctrines and precepts of God, or his revealed will. In addition to the matters already discussed, these words appear to be strategically placed within the sentence so that each builds on the other, from general principles to the truths of the gospel, and from these truths to the word of God.
Within a month of the reception of this revelation, the School of the Prophets was established, and these men did receive the instruction recommended here.
For the most part, those brethren who already had some education were their teachers: Oliver Cowdery, Sidney Rigdon, William E. McLellin, and Orson Hyde. Joseph Smith teaching at the School of the Prophets. Painting by John Falter.
Teaching; instruction. That which is taught; what is held, put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; any tenet or dogma; a principle of faith; as, the doctrine of atoms; the doctrine of chances.
Example Sentences: 1 Whenever you are ill and a medicine is prescribed for you and you take the medicine until balance is achieved in you and then you put that medicine down. A snowmobile. We all derive answers from what we know within the context of our worldview. If our military leaders at all levels only know what they have directly experienced and never accessed the experiences of others, then they will only be able to create limited solutions.
Generally, my focus is on war as a manifestation of political and cultural factors rather than on tactics and strictly military strategy. I get away with teaching this because I am in a Near Eastern languages department, not a history department, so it is a service course for me. As I explain to my students in the introductory lecture, historians are uncomfortable with military history because it implies that the course of history can be changed just because somebody forgot to post his cavalry in the right place.
I was chair of my department in when we started getting frantic calls from mid-level officers asking for language and culture training.
No one in the US government seemed aware of the difficulties faced by the British in their occupation of Iraq in the aftermath of World War I--let alone the Battle of Carrhae, the defeat of Julian the Apostate, or the difficulties faced by the Umayyads in managing Iraq. The Bush administration could not understand why the Iraqi government would not agree to extraterritoriality for US troops in , in ignorance of the fact that capitulations, as such agreements were known in the colonial period, were a major grievance affecting the Ottoman decision to support Germany in World War I and were a significant grievance leading to the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
Now a significant amount of the blame also goes to the schools of political science and public affairs, which also blithely assume that history can be ignored, but there was no excuse for American generals going into Iraq totally ignorant of the relevant history. It looks like I will have fifteen or twenty ROTC students in my World War I class this fall, so perhaps one or two of them will be general officers by the time we next decide it's a good idea to invade a Middle Eastern country.
Great discussion, and I certainly echo what John Walbridge said. Looking back at the bloody 19th and 20th centuries, I believe that the highest realm of strategy has too often proved absent from the minds of otherwise intelligent and experienced soldiers. Generals and future generals urgently need to understand that some apple carts ought not, under any circumstances, to be upset; that even a fragile peace is preferable to the unpredictability -- or, in some cases, the absolute predictability -- of war.
Consider the Germans, those much-admired masters of warfare, who with hardly a second thought twice -- twice! I would like to stir the cauldron: Or; conversely and hopefully, they will have reached the cognitive maturity to understand it is a bad idea to decide a military invasion of a Middle East country and find oneself in an inextricable quagmire, and perhaps achieve the Enlightenment a mutation if you will that winning them over, instead of an invasion, is the best option for the benefit of all.
If future General officers have the "maturity" to recognize that invading and occupying Middle Eastern countries is a bad idea, this will not alter the fact that the decision to do so will not be up to them any more than the decision to invade Iraq in was up to the Generals of that time. Certainly none of my military acquaintances in the period thought that invading Iraq was a great idea and would be easy. The attitude was more one of resignation; "this makes no sense but those are the orders from the top".
The people who most need educating about the limitations of military force and the need to relate ends and means are not future officers, but future politicians - most of whom lack military experience. As for "winning over" Middle Eastern countries, Western efforts to win over Saddam Hussein in and didn't work out so well. How one "wins over" a ruthless thug like Saddam is an interesting question, given their propensity to regard overtures of friendship as weakness or as a green light for their aggressive plans.
Especially, if we are talking about the top brass in the Executive Office of the President. May I add: Resignation does not shed off responsibility.
Does not military history teach a lesson about ends and means? Just take a look at Winston Churchill and the War Office in late early They did not consult the general staff when their hammer fell on the decision to attack Dardanelles. The top brass members e. Lord Fisher of the War Office preferred an attitude of resignation instead of gallant objection.
The end, in number of Britons and their allies who lost their lives and those maimed in that epic front is already recorded in history.
You do not win over by carrot and stick policy; eventually the donkey will tire out and kick back in frustration, despite the stick. I refrain from going into details may have already said too much about that, which is already available in the media, for the fear that I may be arrested in a jiffy and held away without trial at some obscure jail and lose the freedom to enjoy this forum and its estimable quality for freedom of thought and speech for the rest of my life!
Who will kick back; the leader or the populace of the nation, is the should be the toughest dilemma to ponder by both the non-uniformed and the uniformed.
History is full of examples where a leader and his inner circle was bought over but the populace did not take the deal! It winning over has to be a win-win, where everybody acknowledges the fact that this is possible only through compromise.
Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of different policies. A theory is a well-substantiated explanation of an aspect of the natural world that can incorporate laws, hypotheses and facts. A theory not only explains known facts; it also allows scientists to make predictions of what they should observe if a theory is true. Scientific theories are testable. Entry 1 of 2 1a : prudence or wisdom in the management of affairs.
The purpose of a procedure is to tell the reader how to do or make something. The information is presented in a logical sequence of events, which is broken up into small sequenced steps. The most common example of a procedural text is a recipe. A procedural text tells you how to complete a task.
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