Replies 5, AT ; Prin. Fourth, a caveat is in order. That Descartes rejects formulations presupposing the existence of a body commits him to no more than an epistemic distinction between the ideas of mind and body, but not yet an ontological distinction as in mind-body dualism. Indeed, in the passage following the cogito , Descartes has his meditator say:. In short, the intended epistemic success of the cogito does not presuppose any particular mind-body ontology.
As Stephen Menn writes:. The cogito purports to yield certainty that I exist insofar as I am a thinking thing, whatever that turns out to be. The ensuing discussion is intended to help arrive at an understanding of the ontological nature of the thinking subject. More generally, we should distinguish issues of epistemic and ontological dependence.
In the final analysis, Descartes thinks he shows that the occurrence of thought depends ontologically on the existence of a substantial self — to wit, on the existence of an infinite substance, namely God cf. But he denies that an acceptance of these ontological matters is epistemically prior to the cogito : its certainty is not supposed to depend epistemically on the abstruse metaphysics that Descartes thinks he eventually establishes.
See Vinci for an alternative reading. One effort at reply has it that introspection reveals more than what Russell allows — it reveals the subjective character of experience. Importantly, my awareness of this subjective feature of experience does not depend on an awareness of the metaphysical nature of a thinking subject.
Though, as Hume persuasively argues, introspection reveals no sense impressions suited to the role of a thinking subject, Descartes, unlike Hume, has no need to derive all our ideas from sense impressions. But how could ideas deriving from the subjective character of experience justify a substantive metaphysical conclusion about the existence of a real self? On one plausible line of reply, Descartes does not yet intend to be establishing the metaphysical result; rather, the initial intended result is merely epistemic, but not yet fully justified.
This line of interpretation does, of course, imply that the cogito does not initially count as perfect knowledge — an issue to which we now turn. However, there are interpretive disputes about whether Descartes intends the cogito to count — at its initial introduction, prior to the arguments for God — as fully indubitable, and therefore as perfect knowledge.
It is quite common to interpret the cogito as being the first item of perfect knowledge. In Section 6. But here, I want to develop the textual case for holding that even the cogito is undermined by Evil Genius Doubt. As noted at the outset, Descartes is a contextualist in the sense of invoking the notion of knowledge in divergent contexts that presuppose very different epistemic standards.
Of particular interest is that he expressly clarifies that contexts aptly characterized in terms of cognitio -talk do not necessary count as perfect knowledge:. This alone does not prove that the cogito is not intended to count as perfect knowledge. Consider the following texts, each arising in a context of clarifying the requirements of perfect knowledge italics are added :. For if I do not know this [i. I see that the certainty of all other things depends on this [i. Thus I see plainly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge [ scientiae ] depends uniquely on my awareness of the true God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge [ perfecte scire ] about anything else until I became aware of him.
These texts make no exceptions. The first text is particularly noteworthy, because it comes at the end of a paragraph expressly citing the cogito. As Curley writes:. Descartes looks to hold that hyperbolic doubt is utterly unbounded — i. Second, that even cognitions this impressive can be undermined by Evil Genius Doubt, and thus lack the full indubitability of perfect knowledge. Regarding the first point, the Third Meditation opens with meditator attempting to build on the apparent success of the cogito.
What are the internal marks of this impressive perception — what is it like to have perception that good? The answer:. The next two paragraphs help clarify among other things what Descartes takes to be epistemically impressive about clear and distinct perception, but absent from external sense perception.
Of external sensation, the third paragraph offers this:. Though we regularly form judgments based on external sensation, they are easily undermined by sceptical doubt, as shown by the Now Dreaming Doubt. The fourth paragraph offers this:.
Prima facie, this excerpt suggests that multiple propositions are — at this pre-theistic stage of the broader argument — fully indubitable, thereby counting as perfect knowledge.
But there is more to the paragraph. This brings us to the second point noted above, namely, that even cognitions this impressive can be undermined by Evil Genius Doubt — an outcome clarified in the final lines of this same paragraph:.
In order to appreciate the subtleties of this pivotal fourth paragraph of the Third Meditation, we need to clarify the indirect manner in which Evil Genius Doubt operates on clear and distinct perception. How could a doubt undermine the cogito? Part of its impressiveness is that I cannot think about my existence without affirming it, yet I cannot doubt my existence without thinking about it. Seeming to reinforce further the suspicion that the cogito cannot be doubted is a more general thesis Descartes holds concerning the doubt-resistance of any matters that are clearly and distinctly perceived:.
How, then, is it possible to doubt such matters? According to one interpretation, the answer is that we cannot doubt them directly , however, we can doubt them in an indirect manner.
By way of analogy, consider that if a calculator were defective, it would cast doubt on any calculations it generated. Likewise, if my own mind were in some sense defective, this would cast doubt on any matters I apprehended — no matter how evident those matters might seem.
By directing the doubt at the veracity of my own cognitive faculties, I do thereby indirectly doubt the particular propositions apprehended by means of those faculties. A wealth of texts support that this is how the Evil Genius Doubt is intended to operate. Consider these italics are added :. I can convince myself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which I think I perceive as evidently as can be.
I saw nothing to rule out the possibility that my natural constitution made me prone to error even in matters which seemed to me most true. As each passage conveys, the doubt is directed not at the particular object level propositions undermined, but at the possibility of our having a defective cognitive nature. Moments of epistemic optimism : While I am directly attending to a proposition, perceiving it clearly and distinctly, I enjoy an irresistible cognitive luminance and my assent is compelled.
Moments of epistemic pessimism : When no longer directly attending — no longer perceiving the proposition clearly and distinctly — I can entertain the sceptical hypothesis that such feelings of cognitive luminance are epistemically worthless, indeed arising from a defective cognitive nature. Granted, this indirect doubt is exceedingly hyperbolic. Even so, it entails that we lack the full indubitability requisite to perfect knowledge.
Descartes thus closes the pivotal fourth paragraph, clarifying that because of the Evil Genius Doubt, nothing yet meets the epistemic standard of perfect knowledge:.
A later Third Meditation passage — but one occurring prior to the arguments for God — can be taken to suggest a very different interpretation.
On this alternative account, some of the matters we clearly and distinctly perceive are fully indubitable, thereby counting as perfect knowledge even prior to knowledge of God. The passage has Descartes drawing a distinction between what is revealed by the natural light , and what is taught by nature :.
The passage makes clear that the cogito is revealed by the natural light. This is to say that some propositions, including the cogito , may be fully indubitable, thus satisfying the requirements of perfect knowledge — even for atheists. Defenders of an unbounded doubt interpretation would offer a different analysis of the passage.
How, then, do unbounded doubt interpreters deal with this passage? We can indeed take the point of the passage to apply to moments of careful attention: even while directly attending to the probabilistic matters taught by nature , we recognize that there are grounds for doubt; whereas, when directly attending to our epistemically best cognitions revealed by the natural light , we simply cannot doubt them.
This reading renders the passage continuous with our reading of the other passages. In what sense is it an Archimedean point on interpretations rendering it vulnerable to doubt? Insofar as the cogito is the first cognition noticed to resist any efforts at a direct doubt, it can be said to play an Archimedean role.
For it exemplifies the kind of cognitions Descartes employs in his constructive efforts, arguing for a solution to the sceptical problem. Descartes indeed uses the cogito to clarify the epistemically privileged status of clear and distinct perception, even formulating clarity and distinctness as underwriting a general rule for discovering truth.
The passage occurs in the second paragraph of the Third Meditation:. Though interpretations differ, the context of the passage indicates the rule is treated as provisional — i.
On two counts, the announcement of the rule is carefully tinged with caution, in anticipation of the revelation to come two paragraphs later that even clearly and distinctly perceived matters are vulnerable to the Evil Genius Doubt. Section 5. If even clear and distinct perception is subject to doubt, how is the meditator to make progress? How can he construct arguments in the effort to solve the sceptical problem?
For it seems that in the very process of arguing for a truth rule, Descartes is already employing that very rule. In his strategy for making constructive arguments, Descartes builds on the fact that clearly and distinctly perceived matters appear to us to be utterly telling, i.
So, by employing none other than premises and reasoning that are clearly and distinctly perceived, we can make rational progress — this, notwithstanding that those very same proofs fall vulnerable to indirect doubt, once our attention is no longer clear and distinct.
The following Fifth Meditation passage illustrates the point:. Of course, Descartes will need some sort of final solution to the problem of ongoing indirect doubt. In the meantime, he has his meditator attempting to move forward, constructing anti-sceptical arguments. The broader argument unfolds in two main steps. The first main step involves Third Meditation arguments for the existence of of an all-perfect God.
From these arguments the meditator concludes:. Note that the Fifth Meditation advances a further argument for God. In the interests of space, and of focusing on epistemological concerns, however, these arguments will not be considered here.
It is this second main step of the broader argument to which we now turn. But this is too fast. Essentially this point is made in the First Meditation, at the introduction of the Evil Genius Doubt. In short, the most straightforward consequence of an all-perfect creator would seem to be the universal rule: If I form a judgment, then it is true.
What emerges is an instance of the problem of evil, here applied to judgment error. As the passage reasons:. These First Meditation remarks set the stage for the discussion that comes in the Fourth Meditation. Descartes needs a theodicy for error — theodicy being an effort to explain how God is compatible with evil.
The theodicy needs to show that the existence of an all-perfect God is compatible with some forms of judgment error, but not others; somehow, God allows error in our sensory judgments, while guaranteeing the inerrancy of judgments based on clear and distinct perception. In contrast with the First Meditation setting, the context of the Fourth Meditation comes on the heels of a demonstration of the existence of an all-perfect God.
Seeking to resolve the problem, the meditator investigates the causes of error. In the course of the discussion, Descartes puts forward his theory whereby judgment arises from the cooperation of the intellect and the will : the role of the intellect is to consider a perceptual content — i. The investigation concludes that the blameworthy cause of error lies in our improper use of our will.
Neither the intellect nor the will is inherently defective though each is, of course, finite , nor is there inherent defect in the design of how they cooperate — i.
In short, actual mistakes of judgment arise from user error:. The theodicy that emerges is a version of the freewill defense. Accordingly, we should thank God for giving us freewill, but the cost of having freewill is the possibility of misusing it. Since error is the result of misusing our freewill, we should not blame God. Not only is the theodicy used to explain the kinds of error God can allow, it serves to clarify the kinds of error God cannot allow.
On occasions when my perception is clear and distinct, my assent is involuntary and thus not a result of a misuse of my freewill.
Since, on occasions of clarity and distinctness, my assent is the unavoidable consequence of my God-given cognitive nature, God would properly get the blame if those judgments resulted in error. Therefore, they are not in error; indeed they could not be. That an evil genius might have created me casts doubt on my clear and distinct judgments.
That, instead, an all-perfect God created me guarantees that these judgments are true. A clever strategy of argument thus unfolds — effectively inverting the usual reasoning in the problem of evil:. The first premise is argued in the Third Meditation. The second premise arises from the discussion of the Fourth Meditation.
Whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is guaranteed true, because I am the creature of an all-perfect God. The broader case to overcome radical doubt is not yet complete. It seems that perfect knowledge is not yet within his grasp. Moreover, the demonstration itself looks suspiciously circular — the so-called Cartesian Circle a problem to which we now turn. Further reading : On discussions of truth criteria in the 16th and 17th centuries, see Popkin On the dubitability of clear and distinct perception including the cogito , see Carriero , ff , Newman and Nelson He first argues from clearly and distinctly perceived premises to the conclusion that an all-perfect God exists; he then argues from the premise that an all-perfect God exists to the conclusion that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true.
Despite its prima facie plausibility, Descartes scholarship generally resists the vicious circularity interpretation, based on numerous textual considerations. But even putting those texts to the side, it should be surprising that the project would be viciously circular. As Thomas Lennon notes:. The Third Meditation arguments for God define one arc:.
That the broader argument unfolds in accord with these two steps is uncontroversial. The question of interest concerns whether, strictly speaking, these arcs form an epistemic circle. The statement of Arc 1 admits of considerable ambiguity. How one resolves this ambiguity determines whether the arcs strictly form a circle. Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — i.
Arc 2 : The general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived from the conclusion that an all-perfect God exists. The italicized segment of Arc 1 marks an addition to the original statement of it, thereby clarifying the circularity reading. Interpreted in this way, Descartes begins his Third Meditation proofs of God by presupposing the general veracity of clear and distinct perception.
If there is one point of general agreement in the secondary literature, it is that the texts do not sustain this interpretation.
How then should Arc 1 be understood? There are countless interpretations that avoid vicious circularity, along with numerous schemes for cataloguing them. Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — indeed, premises belonging to a special class of truths that are fully immune to doubt prior to establishing the general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived. Again, the italicized segment marks an addition to the original statement of Arc 1.
More precisely, the Evil Genius Doubt is on this reading bounded in the sense that its sceptical potency does not extend to all judgments: a special class of truths is outside the bounds of doubt. Exemplary of this special class are the cogito and, importantly, the premises of the Third Meditation proofs of God. Propositions in this special class can be perfectly known, even by atheists. Thus, the need on this interpretation for Arc 2 in the broader project.
The other main kind of interpretation avoids circularity in a different manner. More precisely, the Evil Genius Doubt is on this reading unbounded in the sense that it undermines all manner of judgments — even the cogito , even the premises of the Third Meditation proofs of God — when the mind is no longer attending to them clearly and distinctly. Insofar as the meditator assents to the steps of these proofs, he does so not because of having an understanding of clear and distinct perceptions as being guaranteed true, but because the mind cannot but assent to them while attending clearly and distinctly.
Importantly, if doubt is thus unbounded there is no circularity. The premises contributing to the conclusion of an all-perfect God remain vulnerable to hyperbolic doubt. It is the unboundedness of hyperbolic doubt that underwrites the No Atheistic Perfect Knowledge Thesis. A central feature of this interpretation is worth repeating. It is natural for critics to ask why the arguments of Arc 1 are accepted by the meditator if, indeed, Evil Genius Doubt remains in play.
The answer lies in our earlier discussion of the indirect manner in which the doubt undermines clear and distinct perception Section 4. However, the meditator does not yet have perfect knowledge of those premises, nor of their conclusions.
How, then do those matters finally rise to the status of perfect knowledge? We return to this issue, below. At present, the focus is on the issue of circularity. Though bounded and unbounded doubt interpretations both avoid vicious circularity, each confronts further difficulties, both textual and philosophical.
Unbounded doubt interpreters must explain why, in the final analysis , the Evil Genius Doubt eventually loses it undermining potency. The first proposition is included in the list of examples that are undermined by the Evil Genius Doubt see the fourth paragraph of the Third Meditation.
The second proposition is a premise in a Third Meditation argument for God — a proposition immune to doubt, according to bounded doubt interpretations. What is supposed to be the relevant difference between these propositions?
Given the indirect manner in which Evil Genius Doubt operates, there seems no clear explanation of why the doubt succeeds in undermining the first proposition but is somehow resisted by the second. Further awkward for this interpretation is that the cogito is included in the list of examples that that same fourth paragraph passage implies is vulnerable to doubt.
Granting an unbounded doubt interpretation, why — in the final analysis — does the Evil Genius Doubt eventually lose its undermining potency? But precisely such moments are when hyperbolic doubt does its undermining work.
This means that upon diverting attention from the premises of Arcs 1 and 2, it is then possible to run the Evil Genius Doubt on their conclusions.
It would thus seem that unbounded doubt interpretations leave us in a Sisyphus-like predicament. According to the myth, each time Sisyphus pushes his boulder near to the top of the hill, the boulder somehow slips away, rolling to the very bottom, and the whole process must start all over.
By carefully constructing the arguments of Arcs 1 and 2, the meditator gains anti-sceptical momentum, pushing his project near to the goal of perfect knowledge. Again, the hard question for unbounded doubt interpretations: Why, in the final analysis, does the Evil Genius Doubt eventually lose it undermining potency? One recent unbounded doubt interpretation Newman and Nelson offers a solution, including an explanation of why Descartes waits until the end of the Fifth Meditation to claim final victory over the sceptical problem.
Here is a sketch of the account. It thus seems that a final solution to the problem would need, somehow, to make it no longer possible to make sense of the relevant sceptical scenarios. Indeed, the interpretation has it the sceptical scenarios become self-evidently incoherent. The needed apprehension of God would need to be self-evident. For suppose my apprehension is grounded in a demonstration.
Thus, the needed apprehension of God is a self-evident, clear and distinct conception that renders — as literally unthinkable — the very sceptical scenarios that underwrite indirect doubt. A useful analogy lies in the doubt-resisting character of the cogito.
If I attempt a direct doubt of own my existence, the effort is self-stultifying; I immediately apprehend that I must exist, in order to attempt the doubt. What Descartes needs is a similarly strong and immediate doubt-resisting outcome in connection with attempts at an indirect doubt. That is, on occasions of trying to undermine clearly and distinctly perceived matters — e. The Fifth Meditation introduces various themes about innate truths, including the positive epistemic effects of repeated meditation: truths initially noticed only by means of inference might eventually come to be apprehended self-evidently.
In the build-up to the passage claiming that the Evil Genius Doubt is finally and fully overcome, Descartes writes:. Given his newfound epistemic standing, the meditator would be unable to make coherent sense of the Evil Genius Doubt. His clear and distinct perceptions would be fully indubitable, thereby counting as perfect knowledge. The interpretation helps explain two passages wherein Descartes purports to be detailing the final solution to the sceptical problem.
In both passages, he can seem simply to be asserting that sceptical doubts are impossible, as if having forgotten the indirect manner in which his own hyperbolic doubt operates. But if we take Descartes to be assuming that the apprehension of God has become utterly self-evident, both passages make more sense. The one passage arises in the Second Replies, in the context of rebutting an objection to the effect that, in the final analysis, it remains possible to doubt clear and distinct perception.
The other passage arises in the Fifth Meditation, in the concluding summary explanation of how the sceptical problem is finally overcome. So, for example, it might seem obvious that we can see our hand extended in front of us, but since we have no ability to rule out the possibility that an evil demon is deceiving us to believe this, we cannot be justified in this belief, and therefore cannot accord it with the status of knowledge.
Exactly how to best respond to such cases, however, is widely disputed, and has been subject to extensive discussion in the philosophical literature. Such thought experiments are, however, useful for helping us think more clearly and rigorously about the foundations of knowledge and proper responses to doubt. Descartes Epistemology : detailed discussion from Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The argument from deception: brief overview of the evil demon argument from TheoryOfKnowledge. Sign In Forgot password?
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Advance article alerts. New issue alert. Descartes argues that if there is any doubt regarding the truth of a proposition, one does not know that proposition. For example, Descartes reflects that although he may appear to know that he is sitting by the fire, the sensory experience of sitting by the fire could be an illusion or a dream. If a sensory experience could be caused by a dream, it is not certain and hence not knowledge.
He reasons that a demon intent on deceiving could easily make it appear to Descartes that he is sitting by the fire, even if this was not the case. It is important to note that Descartes is not suggesting that such a demon exists — the mere possibility of the demon existing suffices to deprive Descartes of knowledge.
Since we cannot determine whether we are being deceived by an evil demon, we cannot rule out the evil demon possibility.
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